Is Progressive Constitutionalism Possible? by West, Robin
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
1999 
Is Progressive Constitutionalism Possible? 
Robin West 
Georgetown University Law Center, west@law.georgetown.edu 
Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 11-91 
 
 




4 Widener L. Symp. J. 1 (1999) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Society 
Commons, and the Social Welfare Law Commons 
HeinOnline -- 4 Widener L. Symp. J. 1 1999
WIDENER LAW
SYMPOSIUM JOURNAL
Volume 4 Spring 1999
IS PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM POSSmLE?
Progressivism is in part a particular moral and political response to the
sadness of lesser lives, lives unnecessarily diminished by economic, psychic
and physical insecurity in the midst of a society or world that offers plenty.
This insecurity is unjust and should end; the suffering should be alleviated,
and those lives should be enriched. To do so must be one of the goals of a
morally just or justifiable state. Not all suffering and not all lesser lives, of
course, give rise to such a response. The suffering attendant to accident,
disease, war and happenstance is neither entirely chargeable to our societal
account, nor is it within our control. A "lesser life" marred by the early loss
of a parent, a parent's mourning occasioned by the accidental death of a
child, or an adult's ongoing trauma set off by a childhood disease, although
cosmically unjust, is neither unjust in the ordinary sense, nor is it easily
ameliorated through politics. In contrast, the suffering attendant to poverty
or stunted opportunities for growth, the suffering attendant to the absence
of supportive communities, or the suffering attendant to the desperate
attempt to nurture children while unsure of one's own physical or economic
safety is largely chargeable to our moral account and may be ameliorated
through politics-at least in a social world like our own, marked by
abundant natural resources, vast economic opportunity, thriving
neighborhoods, and competent police and security forces.
That such suffering exists on a shockingly widespread scale in our world
is a product of two states of affairs. First, it is the consequence of the
decision to allow not simply "property," but vast quantities of wealth to
accumulate in a few private hands, and social and sexual esteem as well as
physical security and well-being to reside in one race and sex. Second, the
suffering is a product of our collective, political and legal inattention to the
suffering those distributions leave in their wake. Progressivism, I will
assume, is marked by a distinctive moral response to that suffering. When
brought on by collective inattention to private maldistributions of wealth,
security or privilege, that suffering is unjust, and for that reason gives rise to
a moral and political imperative: the conditions which give rise to the
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., University of
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suffering must be changed, and changed through some form of collective
action, whicH in turn may (although often times may not) require the
coercive power of the state.
The question I want to raise first is whether it is possible to read the
Constitution, or any part of it, as a part of this progressive moral
imperative? Does the Constitution, as well as political and moral
conscience, require ofus ("us," meaning all citizens, or the polity, or people
who vote, or those who engage in political discourse or have political
influence, or anyone who pledges to uphold the Constitution) a collective
response to the needless suffering attendant to private maldistributions of
power, wealth, or privilege? It should already be clear that what Steve
Shiffrin helpfully calls the "positive Constitution,"! and what I have
elsewhere called the "adjudicated Constitution,,2 is not a part of any such
moral imperative, and indeed, mutes its force. I have described the suffering
that triggers the distinctive progressive imperative as caused by private
power combined with state or collective neglect, and the positive
Constitution, as it has been authoritatively interpreted for the last one
hundred years, at best simply does not address the suffering attendant to
private action and state neglect: neither private action nor state inaction, we
have all been taught to say, comes within the ambit of constitutional
concern. Indeed, quite the contrary. At various times in our all too familiar
constitutional history, and through the construction of various individual
"rights," the Constitution, far from being concerned with such suffering, has
been authoritatively interpreted in such a way as to quite aggressively
protect the conditions which give rise to such suffering against ordinary
forms of political intervention.3 That our positive constitution is so clearly
at cross purposes with the moral imperative that animates progressive
politics in this country does indeed imply that that body of law does actual
harm to this country's disenfranchised. That it has not been the object of
sustained critique from the progressive left is indicative of the indirect harm
it has done to our moral and intellectual culture.of
1. The Constitution as it has been interpreted. See generally Steven H. Shiffrin, Should
Progressives Support the Constitution? 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 253 (1999).
2. The Constitution as it has been construed and applied by the courts. See ROBIN
WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING TIIE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1994).
3. Kenneth Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody's Market: The Political Economy
of Disappearing Brown (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
4. While a number of left scholars have examined the phenomena of "Constitution
worship," see J. M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65
FORDHAM L. REv. 1703 (1997); MARK TUSHNET, RED WHITE AND BLUE (1988); and WEST,
supra note 2, at 155-189, very few in recent years have subjected constitutional norms to
sustained political or moral criticism. Exceptions include Justice Thurgood Marshall,
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Nevertheless, I want to argue against the positive, posited, adjudicated
Constitution, and to suggest instead that the constitutional story, properly
understood, is a part of progressivism's core moral and political imperative:
to wield collective action toward the end of ameliorating the suffering that
is consequent to private maldistributions of wealth and security. Thus, what
I want to suggest is that the Constitution and our constitutional history
should be read as a part of the progressive moral response to such suffering,
that it is indeed unjust and the progressive political response to it as well is
unjust, and that the state or some other form of collective action
representing the will and sentiment of the people must be aimed at
eradicating it. Unwarranted private suffering brought on by private
maldistributions of wealth or power, in other words, is of constitutional as
well as moral significance, and our collective indifference to it is
unconstitutional and shameful. That it is unconstitutional is a part of what
makes it shameful, and the shame is what makes it unconstitutional.
What I do not believe or argue, just to be clear, and as the second half of
my article will make clear, is that either the Constitution or progressivism
is a necessary part of an imperative adjudicated response to such suffering.
Thus, the interpretation or family of interpretations of the Constitution's
progressive promises, for which I will argue, do not lend themselves to
judicial enforcement. Rather, again, they lend themselves, I hope, to political
action and then congressional enactment. I do not mean to suggest that
judicial interpretations of the Constitution (the positive, or adjudicated
Constitution) are irrelevant to the success of a progressive and political .
Constitution. Should the progressive and moral imperative at the heart of
some parts of our Constitution inspire Congress to pass progressive
legislation, and should such legislation be constitutionally challenged, the
interpretation of the Constitution that inspired or guided the legislation at
issue should be deserving of judicial deference. However, that possibility of
judicial deference and the arguments for and against it are not my focus here.
What I want to focus on instead is the potential Constitutional contribution
to moral, and particularly progressive moral and political debate and
persuasion because it is that potential contribution which has been utterly
neglected and even negated by our current constitutional understandings.
Is it possible to understand the Constitution, or any part of it, as directed
toward the twinned evil of private harm and public indifference, and as
mandating, rather than forbidding or simply permitting, political
intervention? I have argued elsewhere that it is,s so here I just sketch,
Reflections on the Bicentennial ofthe United States Constitution, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1987),
which describes the Constitution as reflecting the racial views of the period of its drafting and
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
(1987), which argues that the Constitution is neither egalitarian nor colorblind.
5. See WEST, supra note 2.
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summarily, toward that end, two arguments that might suggest as much:
first a "plain meaning" if somewhat metaphoric interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution,6 and then a similarly summarial understanding of the Due
Process Clause/
First, equal protection. Theorists and jurists, from Antonin Scalia on the
right to Ronald Dworkin on the left, concur that this phrase requires the
courts to police state and congressional legislation for departures from
various norms of rationality. What the Equal Protection Clause requires,
ideally, is that when a state acts, it must treat similarly situated groups
similarly, and differently situated groups differently.s It must be rational in
its demarcation of sameness and difference, and it must not mistake one for
the other. In ordinary politics and in ordinary times, courts need not
aggressively question such demarcations, but in extraordinary legislative
enactments, such as any legislation pertaining to racial injustice, such
deference is not due. The rationality of legislative perceptions of differences
between the races are profoundly subject to doubt. As countless progressive
and liberal commentators have pointed out, this understanding of equal
protection, rooted in Carolene Products,9 and requiring rationality of
legislators in line drawing, has not only been the touchstone of substantial
moral progress particularly in race relations in this country, but it has also
come with real costs. Although equal protection has at one time in this
century been a vehicle for staying a conservative Court's hand when faced
with progressive legislation, and at another emboldened a liberal Court to
strike racially segregatory local and state law, it has more recently, in a
history too familiar to all, led modem courts to strikingly regressive
conclusions.10
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S1.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S1.
8. The rationality understanding of the Equal Protection Clause, particularly as it
relates to social class, took hold in United States 'fJ. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), and
has now achieved such consensus that it has become virtually synonymous with the clause
itself. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI. 1. REv. 1175
(1989); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 147-62 (1996) (discussing affirmative action in chapter 6); see generally
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1436-672 (2d ed. 1988).
9. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938){setting forth the
"rational basis" test whereby any statute will be upheld when challenged so long as the
legislature had a rational basis for enacting the statute).
10. See, e.g. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2580,
135 1.Ecl.2d 1094; Taxman v. Board of Educ. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S.Ct.2506, 138 L.Ed.2d 1010, and em. dismissed 118 5.Ct. 595, 139 1.Ed.2d 431; and City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). The courts in each of these cases strock
down affirmative action programs inasmuch as they were nonremedial in nature.
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Yet, the rationality reading is certainly not the most natural reading of the
Equal Protection Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment says nothing of
rationality, sameness, or difference, and nothing about the judicial role in
policing legislation for departures from such a test. By its language, it
neither requires that legislation when passed be "rational," or that the lines
drawn in legislation reflect real differences in the social world, nor does it
explicitly empower courts to strike legislation that fails a rationality test.
What the Equal Protection Clause does require is that the state not deny
equal protection to some, any or all of its citizens. Ifwe remove the double
negative, "No State ... shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws,"11 what it imposes is an affirmative obligation
on the states to protect citizens and to do so equally. Although the clause
does not specify what the state is to protect citizens from, we might readily
agree on some core applications. Surely, for example, a state may not refuse
to protect some citizens, but protect others, from the threat and dangers of
homicidal violence. Failing to take action against lynch mobs, for example,
while protecting whites against private violence, is a paradigm failure;
perhaps the paradigm failure of the state's obligation to equally protect
some, any or all of its citizens.I2 In our own time, to refuse to criminalize
some violent crimes against women, such as marital rape, is strikingly close
to this paradigm; it is a failure of the state's obligation to equally protect its
citizens against violence.I3
There are three differences I want to stress between this "protectionist"
reading of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the current and liberal understanding of the clause that requires the states to
both equally protect its citizens and work with Congress to legislate
rationally. First, on the protectionist reading, the phrase precludes state
inaction, not state action. What the clause says is that no state shall deny
protection, i.e. no state may fail to protect. It is state neglect, or state
inaction, not action, that is the literal target of the amendment. Second,
what the clause requires of states, through this double negative, is that they
protect their citizens, and that they protect them equally: states are required
to protect their citizens, or at minimum not neglect to do so. Failure to
protect, not irrational enactment, is the target of this part of the
amendment. Third, the Equal Protection Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment within which it appears, read as forbidding the states to neglect
to protect their citizens, envisions a thoroughly political, not legal, response
11. u.s. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. Seegenerally JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LA.W(1965) (discussing how the
current Court is changing direction, aligning more with the goal of the Framers to extend the
national power of protection to all citizens denied their natural and human rights by state
inaction, as well as by state action).
13. See WEST, supra note 2, at 45-72.
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to such failures: the clause empowers Congress, not the Court, to address
those failures through federal legislation. The response envisioned by the
Fourteenth Amendment itself, to states' failure to protect their citizens
against violence, in other words, is passage of legislation such as an anti-
lynching law, a law restricting hate groups, or the Violence Against Women
Act.14 In all cases, the envisioned federal legislation responds to the failure
of states to protect citizens against the adverse affects of unchecked private
violence.
This interpretation, of course, leaves important questions unanswered,
the most important of which is ''protection against what?" That the states
must protect us against violations of our natural rights would have been an
acceptable answer to such a question, but today it will not take us far.
Clearly, protection against violent assault is included in a statement that
echoes the historic purpose of the amendment. The states, then, must be
constitutionally required to protect women seeking abortions against the
life-threatening violence of co-citizens picketing abortion clinics; to protect
children from the life-threatening abuse of natural or step parents; to protect
students from the threats posed to life and limb by gun-wielding high-
schoolers; to protect urban dwellers from the threat to safety posed by
criminality; to protect the safety of all of us against the threat posed more
generally by an armed populace; and to protect wives and husbands against
the life threatening violence sometimes visited upon them by their spouses.
Yet, in none of these cases, has the Court found there to be a constitutional
mandate warranting such protection, and in at least one, the Court has
found the congressional attempt to provide such protection
unconstitutional.IS These judicial holdings are anathema to progressivism
and unnatural readings of the clause. The Equal Protection Clause by its
terms requires precisely the provision of protection against private violence
that the Court has insisted is not required. The Equal Protection Clause
requires the precise congressional action regarding the states' failure to
provide protection, which on occasion, the Court has found to be
constitutionally suspect.16
14. See Violence Against Women Act, Pub. 1. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902-55 (1994).
15. The Court struck a federal attempt to bolster the protection of school children
against violence in United States 'lJ. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Court held that the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. S922(q} exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause
authority. One court found the Violence Against Women Act unconstitutional. See United
States v. Wright, 965 F. Supp. 1307 {D. Neb. 1997}, rev'd, 128 F.3d 1274 (8th Cir. 1997). In
neither case was the argument propounded that the authority to pass the law in question
should be grounded in section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
16. See, e.g. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989)(holding a state, even after receiving reports of possible abuse, has no constitutional
duty to protect a child from being physically abused by his father).
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It is important to stress that the Equal Protection Clause does not limit
the states' duty to protect the positive duty to protect against violence, and
it seems fair to suggest that precisely because the clause is not so limited, that
the duty might go even further. It is at least a permissible interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment that the states must protect us not only against
threats to our safety posed by private violence, but against threats to our
safety posed by private economic exploitation as well. If that is right, then
the collective indifference and even hostility toward poor children's health
and well-being evidenced by the Welfare Reform Act17 is of constitutional
as well as moral significance. It reflects a disavowal of constitutional and
moral obligations of citizenship. The states have a duty to protect their
citizens against threats to safety posed by homelessness and malnutrition no
less than a duty to protect their citizens against threats to safety posed by
ropes, fists and handguns. When the states fail to do so, Congress has the
duty to compensate for the failure. The delegation of the freedom to
disregard this obligation back to the states rather than discharging it, is as
clear a violation of a senator's oath to uphold the Constitution as it is of his
or her moral obligation to do no harm.
Now, what of the Due Process Clause, and particularly, its guarantee of
liberty? Is there any credible understanding of the Due Process Clause
which renders it convergent with, rather than hostile or irrelevant to,
progressivism? Both conservatives and liberals have tended to view the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment as essentially a negative
liberty. If that is the case, then the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is indeed either hostile to, or at best only marginally relevant
to the progressive moral case against private harm and collective
indifference. If "negative liberty" includes economic liberties, as argued
during the Lochner-era,18 it is hostile: if it includes essentially sexual,
personal, familial liberties, as argued during the Roe19 through Case/° era, it
is marginally, but only marginally, relevant.
In modem discourse, conservatives are now trying with considerable
success to re-enliven the Lochner reading, putting the weight of
constitutional law and rhetoric once again squarely behind propertied
interests/1 while liberals are trying to maintain the integrity of the Roe
interpretation.22 Both sides however, view the Constitution's protection of
17. Personal Responsibility and Work Opponunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
18. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
19. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), reh'gdenied 410 U.S. 459 (1973).
20. See Planned Parenthood ofSoutheastern Pennsylvaniav. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
21. See, e.g.,RICHARDA.EPSfEIN, TAKINGs: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND nmPOWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
22. See DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 44-59, 117-146.
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liberty as a protection of negative liberty only. As long as the argument
over the meaning of liberty is premised on the assumption that whatever its
content, it must be negative, the liberty to which the Constitution entitles
us will be either antagonistic or irrelevant to progressive moral arguments
against class, race or even gender privilege.
For the most part, progressives have accepted this assumption, shared by
conservatives and liberals alike, that the "liberty" protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment is essentially negative, and accordingly either
antagonistic to, or irrelevant to, the case for progressive politics. The
consequence is that progressives have in effect conceded the property-
protecting and status-quo-conserving role of liberty; hence the Due Process
Clause. They have done so with good reason because there is plenty of
constitutional history to support such a reading. A negative liberty right to
property (under the Fifth Amendment4 was the cause of the slave holder
in Dred Scott v. Sanford/I, no less than the cause of the propertied classes
during the Lochner era. Progressives then, as now, rarely dispute the
negativity of liberty, or even the centrality of property to liberty.
Progressives, like liberals, have focused instead on equality and equal
protection, urging a substantive meaning of the equality guaranteed by equal
protection. Success by this route is then measured to the degree to which
equality emerges as a meaningful counterweight to the property protecting
role of due process, rendering the Constitution neutral on issues of class,
rather than unequivocally antagonistic.
This concession regarding the meaning of liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment is a mistake. Again, it is surely'possible, and
perhaps more natural, to read the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty phrase
as protecting positive, not negative liberty from undue usurpation by the
states. To show why, I quote from Isaiah Berlin, the most insightful and
influential critic that positive liber;, has ever known. As Berlin pointed out
in his early and influential article, negative liberty, that which is involved
in the question "What is the area within which the subject ... is or should
be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other
persons?"26 is but one of two primary meanings the ideal has taken over the
course of history. The other meaning, which, according to Berlin is by far
the more historically dangerous of the two, but which, he is equally clear,
is just as fundamental an historical longing, is liberty in its positive sense.
By liberty in its positive sense he means that which is involved in answering
the question "[w]hat, or who, is the source of control or interference that
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V, S1.
24. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1856).
25. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts ofLiberty, in FOUREssAYS ON LmERTY 118 (1969).
26. Id. at 121-22.
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can determine someone to do or be this rather than that?"27 He insists the
two are quite different: a good deal of negative liberty is consistent with a
deprivation of positive liberty and vice versa. Speaking of negative liberty,
Berlin notes:
Freedom in this sense is not, at any rate logically, connected with democracy
or self-government.... [T]here is no necessary connection between individual
liberty and democratic rule. The answer to the question 'Who governs me?'
is logically distinct from the question 'How far does government interfere
with me?' It is in this difference that the great contrast between the two
concepts of negative and positive liberty, in the end, consists. For the
'positive' sense of liberty comes to light if we try to answer the question not
'What am I free to do or be?' but 'By whom am I ruled?' or 'Who is to say
what I am, and what I am not, to be or do?' The connexion between
democracy and individual liberty is a good deal more tenuous than it seemed
to many advocates of both. The desire to be governed by myself, or at any
rate to participate in the process by which my life is to be controlled, may be
as deep a wish as that of a free area for action, and perhaps historically older.
But it is not a desire for the same thing.28
IfBerlin's general account here is even close to accurate, then it is simply
bizarre to read the liberty prong of the Fourteenth Amendment as
necessarily concerned with negative liberty only. Rather, it is surely
possible to read the reconstruction amendments, taken in their entirety, as
essentially concerned with providing a guarantee of positive liberty, and it
is equally possible to interpret each of its major provisions (the Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause) in light of that overriding objective.
In other words, it is surely possible to argue that what the reconstruction
amendments added to the Constitution was not an ideal of equality at all, i.e.
whether the requirement of formal legal rationality with its implied mandate
of color-blindness, as insisted by conservatives, or a dollop of substantive
racial equality, as insisted by liberals. Rather, what the amendments added
was a guarantee that the states and Congress protect the positive liberty of
each citizen, and a mandate that states and Congress use law to protect that
freedom. The point of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, is liberty,
not equality at all-equal protection is the means by which the goal, liberty,
is to be achieved. However, if liberty is the goal of those amendments, and
understood in the context of the history that produced them, it must be
positive, not negative liberty that the states are required to protect.
Why positive and not negative liberty? What is positive liberty?
According to Isaiah Berlin, positive liberty is, simply, the polar opposite of
slavery; the self-mastery at the opposite extreme from the state of being
27. [d. at 122.
28. [d. at 129-31.
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enslaved.29 It is the liberty to be free from other's power over oneself. It is
the urge to be in a state of self-mastery. Berlin wrote, in his famous and
critical essay:
The positive sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part of
the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend
on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be a subject,
not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my
own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be
somebody, not nobody; a doer deciding, not being decided for, self-directed
and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing,
or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of
conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them. This is at least
part of what I mean when I say that I am rational, and that it is my reason
that distinguishes me as a human being from the rest of the world. I wish,
above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being,
bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references
to my own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe this to
be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realize that it is not.30
The reconstruction amendments, of course, are there to ensure the
political and moral victories won in the Civil War, central to which is the
abolition of slavery. The Fourteenth Amendment goes further, however.
Not only must the states not permit slavery, but they must also not deprive
the citizen of liberty. What does that add, if not simply a measure of
negative liberty? For the states to be required to not deny liberty,
understood in a positive rather than negative sense, means that the states
must not only police against actual enslavement, but must also guarantee
legal protection for this condition of self-mastery.
This abolitionist reading has the added virtue, I will quickly note, of
harmonizing the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, and it does so
in a way which is both logical and historically sensible. The point of the
Due Process Clause is to guarantee the positive liberty that is the antithesis
of slavery, and the point of the Equal Protection Clause, on this approach,
is not equality at all (equal is in the clause as a modifier, not a noun) but
protection. For the states to fail to protect a class of persons against the
aggression of another class is in effect, to permit the first group to be
enslaved by the other. Should the states deprive the first of the protections
of the criminal laws, for example, the first would be at the mercy of and
subject to the whims of the second group who would thereby become, in
effect, sovereigns of the first group. That is a perfectly adequate definition
of a relationship of slavery: the slave owner is not subject to the sanctions
29. Id. at 131-32.
30. Id. at 131.
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of the criminal law in his relations with the slave. The state, then, is
required to provide such equal protection oflaw because failure to do so
deprives the citizen of his positive liberty without due process of law.
Of course, this leaves open the obvious question of whether economic
oppression constitutes a sort of economic servitude, or put in the positive
terms of liberty, whether some minimal degree of economic power is a
necessary condition of self-mastery. Berlin himself, it is important to note,
did not rule out the possibility, and indeed strongly suggested that it is.31 It
is also worth noting that every important advocate of private property from
Adam Smith to Jack Kemp has answered the question affirmatively. If so,
then the Fourteenth Amendment speaks rather directly to economic slavery;
it is unconstitutional.
The Fourteenth Amendment, so interpreted, targeted at private power
and collective indifference, and mandating political intervention to
ameliorate if not eradicate the suffering incident to it guides, inspires,
somewhat constrains, and prompts, ideally, congressional and state action
as well as the political and public debate that feeds it. The subject matter of
the Fourteenth Amendment, so to speak, is the injustice that perva.des our
private worlds, and it is the distinctive business of states, sovereigns,
leviathans, legislatures, and connresses, to respond to those injustices. We
have leviathans, so said Hobbes, so that we will not have private violence.
The Fourteenth Amendment makes the contract explicit and explicitly
open-ended. The inequities, violations, violence, coarseness and the
injustices of our social world are the appropriate and indeed incontestable
subject domain of the legislator: if she sees an intolerable inequity, it is her
duty as well as her power and right to address it through law. It is why we
have law and lawmakers; it is continuous with the most compelling
justifications of statehood.
It is not, however, why we have courts. Courts do not exist for the
purpose of rectifying the existence of unjustified private oppression through
the passage of ameliorative or protective laws. The courts exist to enforce
the law, and to do so in a way that is, ideally, both caring and attentive to
consequences, and respectful of the ideals of legal justice. To whatever
degree, then, the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to protect citizens
against private injustice and insure the conditions which nurture positive
liberty, and to whatever degree it requires Congress to take action where the
states fail to do so, to that degree the Fourteenth Amendment cannot
possibly be addressed to courts, nor can courts be responsive to its mandate.
The Fourteenth Amendment, in other words, no more anticipates judicial
31. Id. at 122. Berlin offers "It is argued. very plausibly, that if a man is too poor to
afford something ... he is as little free to have it as he would be if it were forbidden him by
law." Id.
32. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 139-143 (1958).
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enforcement than it directs, mandates or prohibits private actions. It
anticipates congressional enforcement, and by its terms, prohibits state
inaction.
As countless progressive and liberal commentators have argued, the courts
have been wrong to think that the Constitution requires state action.)) The
Court is wrong to read into the Fourteenth Amendment a state action
requirement, not because the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits private
action as well, but rather, because the Fourteenth Amendment, properly and
naturally read, prohibits state inaction in the face of private injustice or
violation. That failure to protect, and the failure to protect, more
specifically, the positive liberty of its citizens and not state irrationality, is
the diseased state of social affairs diagnosed by the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The cure for the disease of state inaction, or collective indifference, in the
face of private injustice as mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment is state
action and state protection of its citizens and their liberty. Further cure,
when it is not forthcoming, mandates that Congress, not the judiciary, act
in the case of such a breach, against the private injustice itself. Likewise,
while legislative irrationality may be an evil, and may be one curable by an
assertive judiciary, neither the evil of state irrationality nor the purported
cure of a policing judiciary is the central point of the Equal Protection
Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather,
the central point seems to require state intervention into those private
orderings that cause undue and unjust suffering. The central point of the
Fourteenth Amendment is neither liberal nor conservative, but is
progressive through-and-through.
Against this suggestion, there are at least four salient objections. I will list
them, and then respond to each. First is the lawyer's complaint: if the
progressive aspects of the Constitution can be at best realized through
politics and legislation rather than legal argument and adjudication, then the
progressive Constitution, or even worse, those parts of the Constitution
susceptible to congressional, but not judicial, enforcement simply are not
law. The Constitution, whatever else it is, surely is law, indeed, it is the
supreme law, so any interpretation of it which requires legislative rather
than judicial enforcement fails. The second related objection is that the
progressive Constitution, if aimed at congressional implementation and
political argument rather than judicial enforcement and legal argument, is
not sufficiently serious, or sufficiently imperative or binding it is merely
rhetoric. The third related objection, the idea that the progressive
33. See e.g., LAURENCEH. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 255 (1985)(arguing that
since state action underlies any event in some way, the requirement is not meaningful); see
also David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 SUP. cr.
REv. 53, 59 (1989).
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Constitution should be congressionally rather than judicially enforced,
reflects an undue or inappropriate pessimism regarding the potential for
moral progress through adjudication. The fourth objection goes to the
quality of moral discourse: moral argument should be distinctively moral,
and to constrain it with constitutional demands would be to pollute it in a
peculiarly authoritarian and noxious way.
The first objection that a progressive reading of the Constitution, if
directed at congressional rather than judicial enforcement is not law and
therefore, because the Constitution is law, this reading can't be right. This
simply begs the question regarding the meaning of law. We might define
law as that which courts tum to when deciding cases34 just as we might
define law as the decisions courts make,35 but there is no logical reason we
must define it in such a counter-intuitive way, and to do so in the face of
unpalatable and regressive consequences betrays the pragmatic spirit with
which such definitions of law were initially propounded. We might
alternatively define "law" more ecumenically as including that which
legislatures tum to when deciding what they ought to do as well as what
they must not do, toward the end of upholding their oath of office. If we
define law in such a way, then "law" and "legal argument" have obvious
overlaps with "politics" and "political argument" as well as "morality" and
"moral argument." However, that is surely true of court-centered
definitions of law as well. Where it is the Constitution whose nature is in
part being defined through the definition of the "law" in which it partakes,
such overlap, seems entirely appropriate.
The second related objection is that a progressive interpretation of the
Constitution, directed at congressional rather than judicial enforcement,
cannot be taken seriously because it is merely moral, or merely political, and
for that reason is even in some sense not intended to be taken seriously.36
Short of arbitrarily reconstructing long dead divides between law and
politics, why should this be? Moral argument, precisely because it is moral
argument, is more imperative, more categorical, less contingent, and more
persistently demanding than legal arguments or legal conclusions. Nor is it
at all clear that constitutional arguments directed at the courts and toward
the end of encouraging them to strike legislation are more consequential,
34. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at 46-80 (1977). The court-
centered understanding of the meaning oHaw is implicit in Dworkin's early attacks on Hart's
positivism, and has been widely adopted since, although rarely explicitly.
35. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897)
This definition, of course, stems from the realist movement; See generally LAURA KALMAN,
LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-60 (1986)(describing the impact of legal realism on legal
education at Yale University).
36. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, What is ConstitutionalAboutProgressive Constitutionalism?
4 WIDENERL. SYMP.J. 19 (1999).
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particularly, than a constitutional argument directed toward the legislature
and toward the end of encouraging them to pass legislation. Courts do
indeed have clerks who are lawyers, who read law review articles which
might suggest constitutional arguments that direct judicial decisions which
then have the force of law. Obviously, and likewise, senators and
congresspersons have staff, the majority of whom are lawyers who also
presumably read law review articles that suggest constitutional arguments
that direct legislative actions which undoubtedly would have the force of
law-they would be law. These senators, congresspersons, and their staffs are
often serious people open to persuasion. Some of them are liberal and
moderate Democrats and Republicans, hungry for precisely such
constitutional and moral guidance.
The third related objection is that progressive understandings of the
Constitution explicitly aiming for legislative rather than judicial
enforcement unduly and unjustifiably sell the judiciary short. It is not the
case, so runs the objection, that courts cannot in principle interpret the
Constitution so as to further progressive ends. Rather, it is simply this
particular conservative Court that is disinclined to do so, but that could
change. The particular Congress we are now facing is obviously no more
inclined than the particular Court to give heed to progressive understandings
of constitutional imperatives.37 The personnel of either branch could change
in the short term, but in the long run there are familiar and structural
reasons to put our stock in the judiciary. Judges, unlike legislators, are not
beholden to private interests and private money for re-election. They are,
in short, neither as corrupt nor as corruptible. They are not by definition
looking for a deal or a bargain, their votes are not up for sale, and they will
not personally profit by helping the lion consume the lamb.
This objection, I think, rests on a misapprehension of both the peculiar
virtue required of judges, and the peculiar vice to which they are susceptible.
First, judicial virtue. The progressive impulse, I suggested at the outset, is
a moral response to a kind of human suffering, and likewise, progressive
legislation is grounded in precisely that moral response. The lesser life,
because it is lesser, evidences social injustice, and the suffering attendant to
it must be ameliorated. The progressive legislator sees and responds to this
qualitative difference in the lives of citizens. These people, for no good
reason, suffer more, and that suffering is unjust and the conditions which
give rise to it must change. Progressivism rests, in other words, on
discernment of and then an appropriate moral response to~a particular
difference that divides and defines us; the difference, again, of lesser lives.
Good judging is also rooted in a moral response, but it is a different moral
response resting on a different moral virtue and aimed at a different evil,
aspiring toward a different moral ideal than that which drives progressivism
37. ld.
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and progressive legislation. Good judging is an attempt to do legal justice,
and legal justice, in tum, requires the judge to attend to what is universal
and to wi1lfu11y blind herself to what is particular, in every case that comes
before her. The good judge decides the case by treating likes alike, and is
peculiarly equipped and trained to discern similarity even in the face of
apparent dissimilarity. Our sense of legal injustice is triggered not by the
phenomenon of lesser lives lived out in a society of plenty, but rather, by
the phenomenon of like cases being treated dissimilarly, and for no apparent
reason: by the aristocrat not convicted of poisoning his wife;38 the celebrity
athlete acquitted of double homicide; of William Zanzinger, to quote from
Bob Dylan, the Eastern Shore millionaire convicted and sentenced to only
six months in jail for whimsically murdering poor Hattie Carroll (a black
maid and mother of ten) at a Baltimore Hotel Society Gathering;39 and Mr.
Peacock, convicted and sentenced to only eighteen months in a work release
program for killing his adulterous wife, because the judge found so
eminently understandable his act of rage.40 These cases are revolting and
offensive, presumably even to those of us who believe with good reason that
incarceration and execution are not morally responsible communal
responses to criminality because they are examples of legal injustice. They
exemplify a court's or judge's inability to treat and even see that we
universally share blameworthiness for homicidal acts and to blind herself to
what distinguishes us: wealth, privilege, race, class and sex. Accordingly,
decisions that are unjust in this way do profound damage to the parties and
to the society they disserve; by treating some of us so very differently, they
discommunicate some part of the community in an extremely radical way;
they alienate and divide the community accordingly. The good judge tries
to not do that, and she or he tries not to do that by respecting our
universality, and by so doing, the judge strengthens our community:tt
The impulse to treat likes alike, to apply the law even-handedly, to attend
to the universal, and the virtue on which it rests, is not exclusively the
province of adjudication in criminal cases. It is not too rash to suppose that
there is not a single case in any area of law that cannot be described as an
attempt to do justice between the parties by attending to what is universal
in the conflict, and weeding out what is particular. That is certainly as true
in constitutional law and more particularly in equal protection doctrine as
in any area of law imaginable, and it is easy to see that the dominating
influence of this background judicial virtue has indirectly steered equal
38. See State v. Claus von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995 (R.I. 1984).
39. See Powell v. State, 23 Mel. App. 666,329 A.2d 413 (1974).
40. See Tamar Lewin, What Penaltyfor a Killing in Passion, N.Y. TIMES, October 21,
1994, at 18.
41. I discuss the cases mentioned and others like them, and the judicial virtue or lack
thereof that they evidence, in CARING FORJUSTICE 27·28, 78 (1997).
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protection jurisprudence, as developed by the Court. Thus, to take just one
obvious example: it is certainly not just an incidental feature of Brown v.
Board ofEducationl,2 that the Court relegated to a footnote the evidence of
the lesser lives to which segregation in fact led,1,3 and in the opinion itself
obviated the need to attend to difference by declaring separate schools by
definition, rather than in social reality, unequal.""" More generally, it is not
at all surprising and it may not be entirely "political" that the Court is
persuaded by a reading of the Equal Protection Clause which imposes upon
the legislature and the public a "color blindness" as a response to our history
of racism. Color blindness, like sex blindness, wealth blindness, nobility
blindness, and where-one-is-from blindness is central to the moral mission
of the judge, just as undue attentiveness to such particularizing details is the
vice that defines failure in the enterprise. More generally still, perhaps, it is
not surprising that for seventy-some years now, the courts have read the
word "protection" out of the Equal Protection Clause, and have foisted
upon us instead an unnatural interpretation requiring it to police against
irrational discrimination. This reading has the virtue of allowing the courts
to simply treat legislatures as lower courts and police the rationality of their
decision making, precisely what the Court is required to do when assessing,
interpreting, and applying precedent, as well as when assessing and
evaluating the.handiwork of lower courts. The Court, in other words, may
have happened upon a reading of the clause that requires rationality, rather
than protection, from legislatures, because such a reading then requires of
legislatures precisely the same virtue that is required of courts, that the
legislature treat likes alike, that the legislature dispenses legal justice. The
Court, of course, is exceedingly well equipped to review such
determinations. This reading, in other words, seems natural to courts,
because it suggests a substantive interpretation that makes sense of their
reviewing role.
These two virtues, the generous attempt to alleviate through collective
action undue and unjust private suffering, on the one hand, and the judicial
attempt to underscore through decision-making the universality of human
nature, human aspirations and the human community on the other, are
distinct virtues. The institutions and actors upon which these two virtues
rest, inter-relate, are sometimes in tension with each other, and they are
sometimes complementary. It is clearly the case, for example, that a judge
who is utterly indifferent to all societal consequences of her or his decision
and is determined to do nothing but justice between the parties, is and will
be perceived as a zealot and will likely do great damage through the course
42. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)(declaring separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal).
43. Id. at 494 n.ll (citing social science literature).
44. Id. at 495.
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of such a career. A legislator unconcerned about the rationality of his
decisions and blind to legal justice will be, and be perceived, a tyrant.
Nevertheless, they most often have nothing to do with one another, and it
is not unduly formal to note that judging is more concerned with the
former, and legislating with the latter. A good judge, even a good
progressive judge, tries to do legal justice between the parties, and through
training and inclination, will bring to that task an attentiveness of our
universally shared traits: that is what it means to do legal justice. A
conscientious legislator will try to ameliorate suffering by eradicating unjust
social conditions: that they ground institutions which might both be
necessary to a just society does not collapse the differences between them.
Lastly, it might be objected to that constitutionalizing moral and political
discourse has the unpalatable consequence of diluting it, for two reasons.
First, a moral argument might gain in political force, but it loses in moral
authority if it has the might of the Constitution behind it. Second, a moral
argument should be universal and principled which it cannot be if it depends
on the authority of an historical and political document for its force and
validity. To think otherwise confuses right with might, or moral truth with
political power. "I have the right to bear arms, because it is morally right
that I should have the right to bear arms," is an entirely different sort of
claim than "I have the right to bear arms because the Constitution grants me
such aright." Whether it is right for the state to protect citizens against the
harsh effects of extreme poverty, likewise, is an entirely different question
from whether or not the Constitution requires the states to do so. It does
not strengthen the case for the right to bear arms or the duty to guarantee
welfare to co-mingle such claims with their legal necessity. The claim that
the Constitution guarantees me the right to bear arms, or requires the
welfare state are nothing but contested assertions of positive law; the first are
contested moral claims. It weakens both to confuse them. The legal claims
must stand or fall on the strength of the chain of legal inferences, and the
moral claims must stand or fall on the strength of the moral argument given
to support it. To argue for the latter on the strength of the former does
little but suggest the weakness of the moral argument.
Whatever the merits of this positivist clarity in other areas of law may be,
however, it is not so clearly appropriate in constitutional argument, at least
in constitutional argument outside the courts. When we argue over what a
moral agent ought to do in a hypothetical situation, it may well make some
sense to abstract away from particularizing details of place, era, and history.
But when we argue over whether we do or do not have the right to bear
arms or whether the state does or does not have an obligation to guarantee
decent work or a minimum living wage, we are not talking about abstracted
moral agents, we are arguing about what kind of society we should become,
and hence what kind of society we are and have been in the past. In these
sorts of moral arguments, stories about our past carry great weight, whether
HeinOnline -- 4 Widener L. Symp. J. 18 1999
18 WuJener Law SymposiumJournal [Vol. 4:1
as cautionary tales or tales of heroism or virtue.45 Constitutional argument
has precisely the same structure: to decide whether we have a right or the
state a duty, we argue over how we have constituted ourselves in the past,
and whether we ought to continue to do so or change course. The stories
we tell regarding our constitutional past are of obvious relevance to our
current debates about our political and moral dilemmas. That we have so
divorced constitutional argument from political argument, or rather, that we
so strenuously insist that political argument is a proper part of constitutional
argument, but that constitutional argument should not be brought to bear
on the directly political, is a peculiar overhang from a formalist era. Our
moral and political arguments are not so formally pure as to be uninformed
by our culture and history, and our cultural and historical heritage is not so
rooted in "nothing but the facts" as to have no normative or aspirational
content.
All that follows from this is that the progressive dimensions of the
Constitution and of our constitutional history ought to have some
persuasive power in political and moral contestations over the value of a
progressive agenda. It need not be definitive, and it would rarely be
unchallenged, but there is no good reason to neglect it, and even less to
negate it. Political liberalism has been enriched by the careful and public
elucidation of the liberal impulses in the Constitution put forward by
Ronald Dworkin,46 and conservativism has likewise been strengthened by
the elaboration by a handful of conservative constitutionalists of the
Constitution's conservative themes. There is no reason to think that we
could not articulate a stronger case for progressive politics in this country
by elucidating the perhaps negligible, but nevertheless perceptible, degree to
which we have chosen to constitute ourselves around progressive rather
than regressive moral imperatives, and as evidenced by this foundational
document.
45. See generally LEWIS H. LARUE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS FICTION: NARRATIVE
IN TIm RHETORIC OF AumoRITY (1995)(examining the effects of rhetoric upon judges,
judicial decisions and the Constitution). I argue this point more directly in my review of
LaRue's article, Robin West, Constitutwnal Fictions andMeritocratic Success Stories, 53 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 995 (1996).
46. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985)(presenting a
series of essays discussing legal interpretation and the role of liberalism); RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977)(arguing that the apparent judicial deference to prior
decisions is inconsistent with the positivist ideology of judicial discretion); RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986)(examining what the author refers to as the interpretive
"defects ofposition" in legal reasoning and the development of law); andRONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF TIm AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
(1996)(addressing societal and jurisprudential notions of life, death, and race).
